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Who gains and who loses from trade liberalization? Empirical studies suggest that liberal-
ization is linked to increases in per capita income, implying that the country as whole gains.
But are there bigger winners among the winners or does anybody lose? From an empirical
standpoint the distributional eﬀects from liberalization are uncertain. There is con￿icting
evidence from diﬀerent liberalization episodes as inequality increased, decreased or did not
change.1
Theoretical models also predict that countries gain from opening to trade, although they
are limited in their ability to predict the impact of liberalization for distributional concerns.
Most of these models are silent about the economy-wide distribution of income and wealth,
or the fraction of the population that would support freer international trade. Hence the
relation between openness to trade and inequality remains an open matter in international
economics.2
This paper links the literature on international trade with the macroeconomic literature
on inequality to develop a theoretical framework that provides new insights into the trade-
1The study of the link between openness to trade, economic growth and income inequality a has been
mostly empirical. Berg and Krueger (2003), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002), Dollar and Kraay (2001),
and Edwards (1997) ￿nd that in cross-country regressions openness to trade promotes economic growth and
growth itself reduces absolute poverty; although no systematic eﬀect on inequality is found￿though Rodrik
and Rodriguez (2001) question the connection between openness to trade and economic growth based on
measurement and methodological ￿aws. For country speci￿c cases, Dollar and Kraay (2001) report that
over the last 20 years inequality has increased in China and Mexico, did not change in Costa Rica and in
the Philippines, and decreased in Malaysia and in Thailand. For the case of Argentina, Porto (2003) ￿nds a
decline on inequality upon entrance to MERCOSUR.
2Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) conduct an extensive survey of the literature on trade, inequality and
poverty. Bannister and Thugge (2001), and Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2002) provide thorough de-
scriptions of the channels through which trade policy aﬀects poverty. These are: 1) by changing the relative
price of goods and factors of production, 2) by aﬀecting government revenue, 3) by changing incentives for
investment and innovation, and 4) by modifying the risk exposure to domestic and foreign shocks.
1inequality relation. The framework generates economy-wide distributions of wealth and
income for diﬀerent levels of trade protection and quantitatively assesses long term changes
in inequality. It also determines the households￿ stance on free trade as they might be
diﬀerently aﬀected depending on their speci￿c characteristics, say poor or rich.
One end of the model is to explore whether higher protection on agricultural goods relative
to non-agricultural commodities observed in international trade has long term eﬀects on
capital accumulation and on inequality. ￿Arti￿cially￿ high food prices can potentially aﬀect
households￿ saving behavior.3
The model is a two-sector small open economy calibrated for Mexico. On the household
side I use a Huggett-Aiyagari style heterogeneous-agent, incomplete-markets environment,
where households￿ precautionary saving generates endogenous distributions of wealth and of
income. Household heterogeneity arises due to diﬀerent labor income histories as they are
hit by an idiosyncratic shock to earnings every period. A key element of the analysis is that
households need to satisfy a subsistence ￿oor associated to the consumption of agricultural
goods.4 Within the model subsistence implies that the share of food in household spending
is larger in low income households than in wealthier ones.5
The production side of the model consists of an agricultural sector and a non-agricultural
3Consider the following situation. In the year 2000 in Mexico, the tortilla share of expenditure in the
lowest income quartile was three times that of the highest quartile (McKenzie 2002). In the same year, the
most-favored nation (MFN) tariﬀ on corn (basis of tortillas) in was 198%, and corn accounted for more than
half of Mexico￿s imports of grain (Jank, Fuchsloch and Kutas 2001).
4Obiols-Homs and Urrutia (2005) study the distribution of wealth overtime in a deterministic one-sector
growth model where agents need to satisfy a minimum consumption requirement. They show that if the
consumption requirement is not too big inequality monotonically decreases in transition to the steady state
from below. In a similar study Alvarez-PelÆez and D￿az (2005) numerically explore the evolution of wealth
inequality in transition from below for a broader family of CRRA utility functions. They ￿nd that in
economies with low subsistence levels or high intertemporal elasticity of substitution inequality decreases
overtime.
5McKenzie (2003) and Nicita (2004) document such pattern in Mexican households.
2sector; both goods can be traded in international markets. In the model land is a speci￿c
factor in the production of the agricultural good. Agricultural production requires land,
labor and capital; while non-agricultural production only utilizes labor and capital. Labor
and capital are mobile across sectors and capital is internationally mobile.6
In the model the government levies taxes on consumption, labor income and capital
income; imposes ad valorem tariﬀs on imports; and can borrow domestically to ￿nance its
expenditures.
In contrast to the speci￿c factors model, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, or the imperfect
competition-economies of scale model, in this economy households￿ intertemporal decisions
drive international trade. That is, the country￿s net foreign asset position determines the
trade balance. For example, if positive, interest payments from abroad ￿nance the country￿s
trade de￿cit.
One of the main ￿ndings is that in the presence of subsistence trade liberalization leads to
an increase on income inequality￿consistent with observations for Mexico￿and to welfare
gains for the majority of the population. In the model low income households experience
the larger welfare gains, while wealthier households experience negative welfare changes.
A household with ￿zero￿ wealth and low productivity experiences a gain equivalent to a
permanent 4.8% increase in non-agriculture consumption. Wealthier households are worse
oﬀ due to capital losses associated with the fall in the price of land as the agriculture
sector contracts. A household in the 99th. wealth percentile and low productivity would
experience a capital loss equivalent to a 0.7% permanent fall in non-agriculture consumption.
6Models with traded and nontraded goods usually de￿ne the traded good as a composite of imports and
exports. Hence, commercial policy is de￿ned as a common tax on all international trade. In such framework
neither diﬀerential protection nor the distinction between tariﬀs and export taxes can be studied separately.
3From a population-wide perspective the model suggests that in the no subsistence economy
approximately 70% of the population would vote for free trade, provided that the government
does not make up for the lost revenue by raising other taxes. The model suggests that if the
government has to maintain a constant path of expenditures raising the tax rate on labor
income is the best instrument to oﬀset the fall in tariﬀ revenue. In the absence of subsistence,
a special case of the benchmark model, liberalization leads to welfare gains for the majority
of the population (61%) and has no impact on long-term inequality.7
The apparent contradiction between higher inequality and positive welfare changes can
be reconciled as follows. Inequality is a relative (cross-sectional) measure of household het-
erogeneity in the new steady state, while welfare gains represent (absolute) dynamic im-
provements in household well-being, incorporating mobility within the distribution of wealth
overtime.8
The intuition for these results is that after liberalization domestic prices converge to
international prices and the relative price of food falls. This triggers households￿ buﬀer
7In a similar project Krebs, Krishna and Maloney (2004) use a model with incomplete markets and
idiosyncratic risk to study the impact of trade reform on income risk in Mexico. To work with closed
form solutions their model abstracts from capital accumulation and the agents￿ endowment follows an i.i.d.
process, so it is silent about distributional issues. Under their benchmark parametrization they ￿nd that
the average welfare gain of cutting tariﬀs (regardless of the level) is 0.98% of lifetime consumption. Their
￿ndings are in the same order of magnitude as those from the model with no subsistence when agents have
￿zero￿ wealth.
Other authors have studied the welfare implications of liberalizing world agricultural trade. Anderson
(1998), Ingco (1997) and Tokarick (2003) analyze the eﬀects of liberalization within a representative agent
framework. Their approach distinguishes a terms of trade eﬀect and a distortionary eﬀect associated with
at a r i ﬀ. The estimated welfare cost for developing countries from worldwide liberalization in agricultural
products is approximately 1% of GDP. Such eﬀect is attributed to the rise of international prices currently
depressed by overproduction from developed countries resulting from export subsidies and other support
measures.
8In a similar spirit, Flinn (2002) ￿nds that even though the distribution of wages in the U.S. is more
disperse than in Italy; the long term distribution of welfare in the U.S. has a higher mean and smaller
dispersion than that in Italy. This primarily explained by the higher mobility in the more ￿exible U.S. labor
market.
4savings to decline as they are less likely to hit the subsistence bound; less resources are
needed to buy a unit of food. Inequality increases because the bulk of the eﬀect occurs in
low wealth households since precautionary savings are used to smooth consumption in times
where the subsistence ￿oor is likely to bind. From a macroeconomic perspective this eﬀect
leads to a 1% decline in aggregate asset holdings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model and calibration exercise,
section III presents the results, and section IV concludes.
2 The Model
The model environment consists of households, a representative ￿rm, the government and
the external sector. The economy is characterized as a small-open economy that takes the
good prices and the interest rate as given from international markets. In the model full tariﬀ
pass-through imply that domestic prices may be diﬀerent from international prices so long
the country is a net importer of either or both goods. Hence trade policy might change the
relative price of the goods and distort the allocation of resources within the economy.9
Throughout the model, the non-agriculture good is taken as the numeraire. For this




O be the international relative price of the agricultural good in terms
of the non-agriculture good. If the country were a net importer of both goods, tariﬀ pass-
through implies that the internal relative price would be given by ρ = 1+τA
1+τOρ∗; where τA is
the tariﬀ rate on the agriculture good and τO is the tariﬀ rate on the non-agriculture good.10
9The model assumes long-run pass-through of tariﬀs into internal prices. Feenstra (1989) reports some
evidence on full pass through in Japanese imports of motorcycles into the U.S. market. Nicita (2004) reports
full pass through in imported food products and other manufacturing products in Mexico.
10To facilitate interpretation, notice that by using the internal price (after tariﬀ) of a unit of non-agriculture
good as the numeraire, implies that if the household works one unit of time, the wage rate tells how many
units of the non-agriculture good can be bought.
5In the model households can accumulate wealth in the form of any of the following assets:
￿ Physical capital (K):can be rented out for the production of either good at rate r and
depreciates at rate δ.
￿ Land (L):c a nb eb o u g h ta tp r i c epL and may be rented out for the production of the
agriculture good at rate rL.
￿ Government bonds (B):by no arbitrage yield a rate of return equal to the international
interest rate r∗.
￿ Foreign bonds (B∗):whose return is the international interest rate r∗.
In equilibrium all assets yield the same risk free return so the households￿ portfolio does
not need to be speci￿ed. At a given point in time household wealth is represented by
at ≡ [Kt + pL,tLt + Bt + B∗
t].
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of in￿nitely-lived households, taken to be of measure one, who are ex
ante identical but ex post heterogeneous due to diﬀerent histories of labor income. Their
preferences are de￿ned over agriculture goods (cA) and non-agriculture goods (cO), and need
to satisfy a subsistence level in the consumption of the agriculture good (sA). Households
supply labor inelastically and are assumed to be potentially credit constrained and cannot
borrow. Subject to their initial wealth, their objective is to maximize the expected discounted
utility from consumption.11
To introduce agent heterogeneity, every period t each household is assumed to face an
uninsurable productivity shock εt ∈ E, which evolves according to a p−state ￿rst order
11See R￿os-Rull (1995) for a review of the literature on heterogeneous agents models.
6Markov process with a p￿p transition matrix Π.L e tE ≡ [ε1 ε2 ... εp] be a 1￿p vector that
represents the set E;t h e ne a c hr o wo fΠ represents the probability distribution over E such
that for any state j, πij = P(εi|εj) ≥ 0 for i =1 ,...,p; and
Pp
i=1 πij =1 . Normalizing the
working hours to one, at time t a household￿s labor income is given by wεt,w h e r ew is the
wage rate. This implies that from an economy-wide perspective the aggregate labor supply
is given by N = π∞E0, where π∞ is the invariant distribution implied by Π.
Let A ⊂ <+ be the set of possible values for household wealth; then at time t ah o u s e h o l d ￿ s
s t a t ei sg i v e nb y(εt,a t), where εt ∈ E and at ∈ A.



























c)(ρcA,t + cO,t)+at+1 ≤ [1 + (1 − τ
k)r
∗]at +( 1− τ
n)wεt, ∀t.
Where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and at+1 ≥ 0.
In addition to satisfying the budget constraint and the Euler equation, every household












This equation represents the equilibrium condition that the marginal rate of substitution
should equal the marginal rate of transformation. More importantly it shows how trade
policy distorts households￿ choices. Note that as τA increases the consumption of agricultural
products is expected to fall due to substitution towards the relatively cheaper good; although
the subsistence level binds the magnitude of the reallocation.
2.2 Firms
The production side of the model consists of one competitive ￿rm that takes as given domestic
prices and can produce any combination of agriculture and non-agriculture goods by renting
capital (K) and hiring labor (N). Capital and labor are mobile across sectors and are paid a
rental rate r and a wage rate w. It In addition to capital and labor agricultural production
also requires land. The rental rate of land (L) is rL.
Let fA(KA,t,N A,t,L t) and fO(KO,t,N O,t) represent the production functions for the agri-
cultural good and non-agricultural good, respectively. Each sector￿s production function is
assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, to satisfy the Inada conditions and that each












∂L∂NA > 0 for i = A,O.12
12If there were more than one ￿rm, because of constant returns to scale the ￿rms would only be scaled
versions of each other. Therefore, assuming only one ￿rm is without loss of generality.
8The ￿rm￿s problem at time t is:
max
{KA,t;KO,t;NA,t;NO,t;Lt}
ρfA(KA,t,N A,t,L t)+fO(KO,t,N O,t)
− w(NA,t + NO,t) − r(KA,t + KO,t) − rLLt
subject to KA,K O,N A,N O,L≥ 0 for every period t.
To solve the model numerically I assume the following functional forms for the production
functions:








One feature of the economy is that since in equilibrium the rental rate of capital only
depends on the international interest rate and the depreciation rate (r = r∗+δ), the capital-
labor ratio in the non-agriculture sector and thus the wage rate are pinned down by the
world interest rate (r∗). This means that any change in trade policy re￿ected in ρ does not
aﬀect the wage rate nor the return on capital; although it would reallocate resources between
sectors and change the price and rental rate of land to equalize returns across all assets.
2.3 Aggregation
As stated before, from an economy-wide perspective, aggregate labor is given by N = π∞E0.
Aggregate capital (K) is determined by the ￿rm￿s demand for capital. The supply of land
¡ﬂ L
¢
is ￿xed and exogenous. However, on a given date, the state of the economy is characterized
by how agents are positioned across levels of asset holdings and individual shocks. For this
9purpose, let A denote the Borel sets that are subsets of A (asset space) and let E be the set of
all subsets of E (productivity space). Then letting (X,X)=( A ￿ E,A￿E) be the product
space, we can de￿ne a probability measure on (X,X) such that ￿ : X → [0,1] represents the
distribution of households in the state space.
Such distribution is the basis for computing economy-wide variables such as aggregate
asset holdings At a n dt o t a lc o n s u m p t i o no fe a c hg o o d(CA,t,C O,t) at any point in time.
2.4 Government
T h eg o v e r n m e n ti sa s s u m e dt oc o n s u m eac o n s t a n ta m o u n to ft h en o n - a g r i c u l t u r a lg o o d(G)
every period and makes no transfers. To ￿nance its consumption the government levies taxes
and can borrow domestically. Indirect taxes from international trade are collected as long as
there are imports of either commodity. Let MA,t ≡ (CA,t −YA,t) denote agricultural imports
and MO,t ≡ [CO,t + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + G − YO,t] denote non-agriculture imports.
Whenever the country is a net importer of both goods the government￿s debt evolves















Where the initial amount of debt, B0, is given.13
13If there are no agricultural imports then
τAp∗
A




pO MO,t =0 .
102.5 Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is a set of taxes (τk,τn,τc,τA,τO), a set of decision
rules {cA (ε,a),c O (ε,a),a 0 (ε,a)}, a set of prices (w,r∗,r,r L,p L,ρ∗), aggregate level of asset
holdings (A), government debt (B), net foreign assets (B∗), and eﬀective labor (N),a n da
probability measure ￿ such that:
1. The decision rules solve the households￿ problem.
2. The ￿rm￿s problem is solved.
3. The market for savings clears:
K + B + B



















5. The probability measure ￿, is a stationary distribution consistent with the transition




P(x,κ)d￿, for all κ ∈ X.
Where P(x,κ) is the probability that a household with state x next period will have
state κ w h i c hi sa ne l e m e n to fX.14







cO(x)d￿ + δK + G = ρYA + YO + r
∗B
∗.
14The structure of the transition probability matrix Π, along with (the existence of) the solution to the
households￿ problem guarantee that there exists a unique ￿xed point of ￿ for any initial distribution ￿0. See
Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) and Huggett (1993).
112.6 Parametrization and Solution Method
In order to ￿nd the economy￿s steady state under the current ￿scal regime and the one with
liberalized trade I use the standard techniques for solving models with incomplete markets
and heterogeneous agents. In Appendix A, I outline the steps of the solution algorithm.15
I calibrate the model to the Mexican economy since Mexico applies relatively high tar-
iﬀs on agriculture and non-agriculture imports, and exhibits diﬀerential protection towards
agricultural goods. The ad valorem average tariﬀ rates in 2001 for agricultural imports was
24.5% and 17.1% for non-agricultural goods (WTO, 2004). Another attribute that makes
Mexico a good candidate is that it has been consistently running trade de￿cits on both types
of goods in the last decade (INEGI, 2004).
The model is calibrated such that every model period represents one year. The calibration
exercise focused on matching as close as possible the comparable features of the model
economy to the Mexican economy based on parameter values estimated for Mexico when
available. Table 1 contains the parameter values from the benchmark calibration.
In the absence of speci￿c estimates for Mexico, I use standard values found in the literature
for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/σ) and the depreciation rate (δ). The
discount factor (β) and the international interest rate (r∗) are chosen to match certain
moments of the data such as the trade balance.
On the ￿scal side I estimated eﬀective (average) tax rates for consumption, labor income
and capital income for the 1993-2000 period based on the methodology proposed by Mendoza,
Razin and Tesar (1994). Average tariﬀ rates on agricultural and non-agricultural products
15See R￿os-Rull (1995) for a summary description of these methods.
12are taken from WTO (2004) for the year 2001. The debt to GDP ratio for Mexico was taken
from the World Bank￿s ￿World Development Indicators￿ database.
For technology, based on Gollin (2002), I take the capital share of income to be 30% as
a conservative estimate for a developing country.16 Two studies on agricultural technology
(Manuelli and Seshadri (2004) and Soloaga (2000) suggest that the land share of income in
agriculture is in the order of 20%. Although, they diﬀer in their estimate on the labor share
of income as Manuelli and Seshadri estimate it to be 40% in the 1960￿s in the U.S., while
Soloaga estimates it in the order of 25% from a small sample of Mexican farms surveyed in
1995.
The transition between productivity states was parametrized based on Budar-Mej￿a and
Garc￿a-Verdœ (2003). In their study they estimate the transition probabilities between formal
employment, informal employment, unemployment and out-of-the-labor force in Mexico for
the period between 1994 and 2001. In the model I interpret idiosyncratic shocks as diﬀerent
productivity states which can be matched to formal employment, informal employment, and
a joint low productivity state for those unemployed or out of the labor force. The values of
the elements of the productivity vector E are such that average productivity is equal to 1
and yield a Gini coeﬃcient of income closest to that observed in Mexico.
In regard to preferences, the weight on agricultural consumption (χ) is such that model￿s
trade balance composition matches that of the Mexican economy in the year 2000. The
subsistence level (sA) was calculated based on the World Bank￿s (2004) estimates of the
food based poverty line for Mexico. To do so, I used the value of the basket for the year
2000 and multiplied it by Mexico￿s population (see INEGI, 2001), and then I expressed it
as a proportion of GDP in the same year. This approach would tell how much of Mexico￿s
16Unoﬃcial estimates for Mexico from the Bank of Mexico point to the same order of magnitude.
13output was used to satisfy ￿subsistence￿ consumption. For the year 2000, the estimated share
of Mexico￿s GDP used to satisfy subsistence was in the order of 6.5%.
2.7 Welfare
To conduct the welfare analysis I compute the constant percentage increment in non-agricultural
consumption under no reform (NR) that in expectation renders a given household (with
state x0 = {ε0,a 0})i n d i ﬀerent between the status quo and trade liberalization. Assuming
the economy is in the steady state and that there is an unannounced permanent change in














To quantify the welfare eﬀect of liberalization reported in section 3, I simulated forward
the ￿life￿ of many households with the same initial level of wealth and productivity, then I
averaged their discounted utilities and found the γx0 that equalized the average discounted
utility under both regimes.17
To exploit the heterogeneity implied by the model I chose households with ￿zero￿ wealth,
median wealth, mean wealth, and those in the 99th. wealth percentile for the three levels of
productivity.
From a population-wide perspective, when all households are equally weighted, the aver-
age welfare change from liberalization is the γ that satis￿es the following equation:

























In this case γ is also interpreted as the constant percentage increase in non-agricultural
consumption that gives the same expected utility with and without reform.
If the government were to change the tax mix to compensate for the lost tariﬀ revenue
by raising other taxes, a similar welfare analysis between the status quo and the new policy
regime can be performed. Furthermore, the average welfare change provides a selection
criteria to chose among alternative policies. A ￿utilitarian￿ social planner would choose the
post-liberalization regime that maximizes the average welfare change.
3R e s u l t s
To assess the distributional and welfare implications of liberalizing trade in the model econ-
omy, I work under two scenarios: one with subsistence and one without subsistence (i.e.




Under each scenario the exercise is conducted in three steps. First, without any change in
￿scal or trade policy I compute the steady state. I call this the no reform economy. Second,
I eliminate tariﬀs on both goods and name the new steady state the reform economy with
liberalized trade. In this step it is assumed that the government does not change any other
tax rates. In the third step, the government is compensated for the lost tariﬀ revenue by
increasing either capital income taxes, labor taxes or consumption taxes such that the path
of government expenditures (G) remains constant overtime.
15The results presented in the next two subsections are common to the two subsistence
scenarios.
3.1 Prices and Production
Due to diﬀerential protection towards agricultural goods, the immediate eﬀect of trade lib-
eralization is a decline in the relative price of the agricultural good as it converges to the
international relative price (recall ρ =
(1+τA)
(1+τO)ρ∗ > ρ∗).
Table 2, shows that after liberalization the interest rate and the wage rate do not change
as they are pinned down by the international interest rate. However, due to the decline
in the price of the agriculture good resources are reallocated to the non-agriculture sector
leading to a fall in the price and rental rate of land (see tables 2 and 3)18. The intuition
for this result is that since land is speci￿c to the production of agricultural goods and less
labor and capital are allocated into agriculture, the rental rate of land, determined by its
marginal productivity, falls. A lower ￿dividend￿ on land requires a lower price of land in order
to align the its return to that of the other assets. This suggests one channel through which
liberalization aﬀects the distribution of wealth and income as land owners incur a capital
loss and a permanent fall on land income. This ￿nding is summarized in the following
proposition.19
Proposition 1 If τA > τO > 0, then any policy change towards less diﬀerential protection
(including liberalization) leads to a reduction in the price of land (pL).
Proof. See Appendix B.
18This prediction is consistent with evidence from Latin America, where land prices have fallen in periods
of trade liberalization (see World Bank, 2003).
19Note that the proposition is not constrained to the stationary equilibrium.
16In terms of factor payments the supply side of the model suggests that on impact house-











pO do not change
´
.20 The purchasing power
of land owners falls in terms of both goods (see table 2).
3.2 Macroeconomic Overview
Under both subsistence scenarios the model closely matches some features of the Mexican
economy (see tables 4 and 7). Also, both economies exhibit some anticipated eﬀects of
liberalization. Namely, the consumption share of GDP increases, the government share of
GDP falls (when the lost tariﬀ revenue is not compensated for), the trade de￿cit increases,
tax revenue falls, and the composition of the trade de￿cit shifts towards more imports of the
agricultural good.21
An important diﬀerence between the two economies is that without subsistence there
are no distributional eﬀects from liberalization; while with subsistence wealth and income
inequality increase.
3 . 3 S c e n a r i o1 :N os u b s i s t e n c e
In the absence of subsistence trade liberalization has no eﬀect on inequality, although there
are welfare gains for the majority of the population (see tables 4 and 6). The biggest welfare
gains from are for those with ￿zero￿ wealth; while the top 1 percent of the population is worse
oﬀ. In fact, 61% of the population would vote in favor of reform. Wealthier households lose
20The workers￿ gain in terms of the agricultural good is consistent with the speci￿c factors model (assuming
land￿speci￿c to agriculture￿and labor are the only inputs in the production of the agriculture good).
However, the symmetry between the models is not preserved as the speci￿c factors model would predict a
loss in terms of the non-agriculture good.
21Furthermore, the economy with no subsistence only imports agricultural goods and exports a small
amount of non-agricultural goods.
17since the fall in the price of food is not enough to compensate the capital loss due to the fall
in value of land. Overall, the average welfare gain from liberalization for the whole economy
is a permanent 0.1% increase in consumption of the non-agriculture good.
An important aspect of the model with no subsistence is that the fraction of consumption
that corresponds to the agricultural good is constant for every level of wealth (see ￿gure 2).
Thus the change in the relative price aﬀects all households equally and preserves the long
run distribution of wealth.
In terms of the economy￿s asset structure table 5 suggests that in the long-run households
make up for the decline in the capital stock and for the fall in the value of land by holding
more foreign bonds to keep asset holdings constant.
If the government has to maintain a constant path of expenditures (G), the fall in tariﬀ
revenue must be compensated by increasing other taxes. Table 6 shows that, except for the
agents with ￿zero￿ wealth, raising labor taxes (τn) is the least welfare reducing instrument;
followed by consumption taxes (τc) and capital income taxes (τk). Moreover, raising τn
yields the lowest average welfare loss for the economy as a whole.
Each instrument redistributes the tax burden diﬀerently. Increasing τn redistributes part
of the burden on poor households as their primary source of income is from labor. Households
with ￿zero￿ wealth and ￿low￿ or ￿medium￿ productivity prefer raising τk as they have no capital
to be taxed upon; while households with no wealth and ￿high￿ productivity favor raising τc
rather than τk as they likely to be big savers in the short term. Raising τk redistributes the
burden on wealthier households and would lead to a 7% decline in overall asset holdings (see
table 5).
18An important ￿nding is that if the fall in tariﬀ revenue has to be oﬀset by raising other
taxes, more than half of the population would vote against trade liberalization.
3.4 Scenario 2: Subsistence
The main diﬀerence between the economy with subsistence and without subsistence is that
trade reform is no longer neutral to inequality when there is a minimum consumption re-
quirement for food. In the economy with subsistence the Gini coeﬃcients for wealth, income
and consumption increase after liberalization (see table 7).
When subject to satisfying a subsistence level, the fraction of households￿ consumption
of agriculture goods is decreasing in wealth, and tends to the no subsistence proportion
(see ￿gure 2). That is, in poorer households the food share of expenditure is larger that in
wealthier ones; thus liberalization has a non-homothetic eﬀect.22
Even though the increase in inequality is modest, it is qualitatively in line with the
estimates for Mexico from the World Bank (2004) that reports a 1.8% increase in inequality
between 1992 and 2000.
The greater diﬀerence between the two scenarios is in terms of welfare. The model with
subsistence predicts a greater welfare gain for the bottom three levels of wealth under study.
The welfare gain of a household with ￿zero￿ wealth and low productivity is a permanent 4.8%
increase of non-agricultural consumption; while it is 1% in the model without subsistence. On
average, the welfare gain with subsistence is 2.6 times that of the model without subsistence.
In the model with subsistence, 70% of the population would vote in favor of the reform as
22This behavior is consistent with the empirical ￿ndings by McKenzie (2003), where the food share of
expenditure of Mexican households with lower level of education￿presumably poorer￿is bigger than that
of more educated households; and by Nicita (2004), who ￿nds that 50% of the consumption of poor households
in Mexico is on food.
19they would experience positive welfare gains; for the rest, the capital loss due to the fall in
the value of land outweighs the gain in lower relative price.
The intuition for these results is that the distortion in relative prices associated to the
tariﬀ protection, pushes low income households closer to subsistence levels by raising the
relative price of food. Once the distortion is lifted, poor households are the ones that gain
the most and reduce their buﬀer savings as they are less likely to hit the subsistence bound
(see table 8).23
In terms of the ￿optimal￿ tax instrument when the government has to maintain a constant
expenditure path, the model with subsistence suggests that, except for the households with
￿zero￿ wealth, raising labor taxes is the least welfare reducing policy choice, followed by
raising consumption taxes and capital income taxes (see table 9). Like in the model with no
subsistence when the tariﬀ r e v e n u em u s tb eo ﬀset less than half of the population bene￿ts
from liberalization.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The main result from the paper is that in the presence of subsistence levels trade reform
leads to a worsening of the distribution of wealth and income in the long-run, although there
are welfare gains for the majority of the population.
In the model with no subsistence trade liberalization has no impact on inequality and the
welfare gains are relatively smaller than in the model with subsistence.
The model suggests that land owners would be worse oﬀ after liberalization as the rental
23Nicita (2004) reports that in Mexico in the 1990￿s, the relative price of non-animal agricultural products
declined after the integration with the U.S. and Canada through the NAFTA.
20rate of land and the price of land fall with the relative price of the agricultural commodity.
This capital loss breaks the population into two groups: the ones that favor reform (experi-
ence welfare gains as the fall in the relative price of food oﬀsets the capital loss) and those
that oppose reform (the fall in relative price does not compensate the fall in the value of
land). In the model with no subsistence 61% of the population backs the reform. In the
model with subsistence 70% of the population would vote for free trade.
Ia l s o￿nd the optimal tax instrument to oﬀset the fall in tariﬀ revenue when the govern-
ment has to maintain a constant path of expenditures. In both cases, with no subsistence
and with subsistence, labor taxes are the best instrument, although less than half of the
population would support liberalization.
In future research it would be important to account for diﬀerent skills in the labor force,
explicitly model the eﬀects of trade policy in the non-traded sector of the economy, and
investigate alternative productivity processes underlying household heterogeneity aside of
employment shocks.
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24Appendix A
Solution Algorithm
The algorithm for computing the steady state equilibrium of the calibrated economy for
ag i v e ns e to ft a r i ﬀ rates consists of three steps.
1. Solving the Firm￿s Problem
Given the tax rates, the tariﬀ rates, the international interest rate, the international
relative price of the agricultural good, and the exogenous supply of labor and land, the
￿rm￿s production plan consists of the labor and capital allocated for the production of each
g o o d .S u c ha l l o c a t i o ni nt u r nd e t e r m i n e st h ew a ge rate, the rental rate of land and the price
of land.
2. Solving the Households￿ Problem
I exploit the recursive form of the households￿ problem to numerically solve it by iterating
on the Euler equation. The method requires a grid on the state space (productivity and
wealth combinations), and an initial guess of the derivative of the value function with respect
to wealth at every grid point. Then one ￿nds a decision rule that satis￿es the Euler equation
for next period wealth given current wealth and productivity, and the initial guess is updated
based on the problem￿s envelope condition. This step is repeated until the derivative of the
value function approximately converges. When the decision rule is not an element of the
grid I approximate it by linear interpolation.
3. Computing the Stationary Distribution24
For any level of trade protection the state of the economy is characterized by the dis-
tribution of households over the state space. As discussed in section 2.5, the solution to
the households￿ problem and the properties of the productivity process guarantee a unique
stationary distribution. Furthermore, any initial distribution converges to the stationary dis-
tribution. To compute the stationary distribution I use the invariant densities over shocks
and I approximate distribution functions over assets by a piecewise linear function over the
wealth space. The grid for the distribution functions should be ￿ner than that used to solve
the household problem.
The algorithm to compute the stationary distribution consists of two steps: 1) initializing
the piecewise distribution functions (one for each productivity state), and 2) iterating the
distribution functions until they approximately converge. The distribution functions are
updated by identifying the source of the current mass on a given grid point based on the
transition probabilities and the decision rules; that is, by determining the previous period
set of states consistent with the grid point.
24This description closely follows that in Rios-Rull (1997).
25Appendix B
Price of Land Decreases with Liberalization
In this section I show how a reduction in diﬀerential protection leads to a decline in the
price of land.
1. The agriculture sector contracts




− w(NA,t + NO,t) − r(KA,t + KO,t) − rLLt
subject to KA,t,K O,t,N A,t,N O,t,L t ≥ 0 where kO,t ≡
KO,t
NO,t.
























Note from equation (B4) that r∗ uniquely pins down kO,t. Since labor is mobile across
sectors, given kO,t equation (B5) determines the economy-wide wage rate.
Next need to show that as ρ falls, when the country moves towards less diﬀerential pro-
tection, KA,t and NA,t.fall as well.
Note from equations (B1) and (B2) that given that the right hand side is ￿xed, any fall




∂KA,t , respectively. Hence KA,t and NA,t
must fall and the agriculture sector contracts.
262. The rental rate of land (rL) falls along with ρ.
Equation (B3) shows that there are two enforcing eﬀects that lower rL as ρ falls: i) rL is







3. From steps 1 and 2, as ρ falls due to lower diﬀerential protection, so will NA,K A and
rL. Since in equilibrium the market for land has to clear and all assets yield the same
return the following equation must be satis￿ed







T h u sa st h er e n t a lr a t eo fl a n df a l l s ,s od o e st h ep r i c eo fl a n d .
27Table 1. Model Parametrization
Parameter Target Source
Preferences Discount factor β  = 0.96 RBC literature
Subsistence level sA = 0.154 World Bank (2004)
Agriculture share in consumption:
No subsistence χ  = 0.142 MA / Trade Balance
Subsistence χ  = 0.047 MO / Trade Balance
Coefficient of relative risk aversion σ  = 1.5 RBC literature
Technology Capital share (non-agriculture) α  = 0.3 Gollin (2002)
Land share (agriculture) λ  = 0.2 Soloaga (2000)
Labor share (agriculture) ν  = 0.4 Soloaga (2000)
Depreciation rate δ  = 0.1 RBC literature
International interest rate r* = 3.5% Trade Balance / GDP
Productivity Process π (e h|e h) 0.537
π (e h|e m) 0.317 Budar-Mejía and
π (e m|e h) 0.311 García-Verdú (2003)
π (e m|e m) 0.496
π (e l|e h) 0.369
π (e l|e m) 0.447
E = (e h,e m,e l) (1.91, 0.43, 0.17) Gini coefficient (income)
Taxes Tariff on agriculture τ
A = 24.5% WTO
Tariff on non-agriculture τ
O = 17.1% WTO
Tax on capital income τ
k = 6.5% Mendoza, Razin, Tesar (1994)
Tax on labor income τ
n = 14% Mendoza, Razin, Tesar (1994)
Tax on consumption τ
c = 7.8% Mendoza, Razin, Tesar (1994)
Price World Relative Price of Agriculture Goo ρ
∗  = 0.583 (  YA / GDP,   YO / GDP  )τ
A = 24.5%, τ
O = 17.1% τ
A = τ
O = 0
Relative Price ρ  = PA/PO 0.6194 0.5826
r* 0.0350 0.0350
Inputs Wage 0.9856 0.9856
Rental Rate Land 0.0264 0.0194
Price of Land 0.7534 0.5546
Wage/PA 1.5912 1.6918
Purchasing Power r*/PA 0.0565 0.0601
RRL/PA 0.0426 0.0333
τ
A = 24.5%, τ
O = 17.1% τ
A = τ
O = 0
Labor NA/N 0.0535 0.0394
NO/N 0.9465 0.9606
Capital KA 0.3906 0.2875
KO 2.9616 3.0058
Land L 1.0000 1.0000
Table 2. Relative Prices
Table 3. ProductionData (2000) τ
A = 24.5%, τ
O = 17.1% τ
A = τ
O = 0 τ
κ  = 10.1% τ
n = 14.4% τ
c = 8.2%
A = Agriculture YA / GDP 0.09 0.0900 0.0669 0.0669 0.0669 0.0669
O = Non-Agriculture YO / GDP 0.91 0.9100 0.9331 0.9331 0.9331 0.9331
C = Consumption C / GDP 0.67 0.6425 0.6516 0.6399 0.6485 0.6491
I = Investment I / GDP 0.24 0.2289 0.2272 0.2272 0.2272 0.2272
G = Government Spending G / GDP 0.12 0.1457 0.1446 0.1471 0.1471 0.1471
TB = Trade Balance TB / GDP -0.02 -0.0170 -0.0234 -0.0143 -0.0229 -0.0234
TB composition MA / TB 0.08 0.0810 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
TB composition MO / TB 0.92 0.9190 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B = Government Debt B / GDP 0.23 0.2320 0.2344 0.2344 0.2344 0.2344
R = Tax Revenue R / GDP 0.13 0.1551 0.1541 0.1568 0.1567 0.1566
TR = Tariff Revenue TR / R 0.05 0.0165 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wealth 0.4612 0.4612 0.4647 0.4605 0.4612
Gini Coefficient Income 0.54 0.4115 0.4115 0.4110 0.4111 0.4115
Consumption 0.1883 0.1883 0.1896 0.1885 0.1883
Table 4. Selected Macroeconomic Variables: No Subsistenceτ
A = 24.5%, τ
O = 17.1% τ
A = τ
O = 0 τ
κ  = 10.1% τ
n = 14.4% τ
c = 8.2%
K 3.3522 3.2933 3.2933 3.2933 3.2933
L (value) 0.7534 0.5546 0.5546 0.5546 0.5546
B 0.3398 0.3398 0.3398 0.3398 0.3398
 B* 0.7119 0.9696 0.5912 0.9465 0.9696
Total Assets 5.1573 5.1573 4.7789 5.1342 5.1573
τ
A = τ
O = 0 τ
κ  = 10.1% τ
n = 14.4% τ
c = 8.2%
'Zero' wealth 1.016 0.581 0.451 0.560
Low Median wealth 0.030 -0.678 -0.409 -0.420
productivity Mean wealth -0.016 -0.750 -0.451 -0.468
99th Percentile -0.731 -1.875 -1.077 -1.179
'Zero' wealth 1.016 0.570 0.450 0.560
Medium Median wealth 0.044 -0.674 -0.396 -0.406
productivity Mean wealth -0.005 -0.746 -0.442 -0.457
99th Percentile -0.723 -1.873 -1.070 -1.171
'Zero' wealth 1.016 0.481 0.452 0.560
High Median wealth 0.159 -0.622 -0.297 -0.291
productivity Mean wealth 0.107 -0.695 -0.342 -0.343
99th Percentile -0.638 -1.860 -0.997 -1.087
Average gain 0.100 -0.630 -0.340 -0.351
Table 5. Asset Holdings: No Subsistence
Table 6. Welfare (% of no-reform c 0): No SubsistenceData (2000) τ
A = 24.5%, τ
O = 17.1% τ
A = τ
O = 0 τ
κ  = 13.1% τ
n = 14.8% τ
c = 8.6%
A = Agriculture YA / GDP 0.09 0.0900 0.0669 0.0669 0.0669 0.0669
O = Non-Agriculture YO / GDP 0.91 0.9100 0.9331 0.9331 0.9331 0.9331
C = Consumption C / GDP 0.67 0.6534 0.6639 0.6424 0.6579 0.6590
I = Investment I / GDP 0.24 0.2289 0.2272 0.2272 0.2272 0.2272
G = Government Spending G / GDP 0.12 0.1502 0.1467 0.1518 0.1518 0.1518
TB = Trade Balance TB / GDP -0.02 -0.0325 -0.0378 -0.0212 -0.0368 -0.0379
TB composition MA / TB 0.08 0.0798 0.6050 1.0000 0.6140 0.5965
TB composition MO / TB 0.92 0.9202 0.3950 0.0000 0.3871 0.4040
B = Government Debt B / GDP 0.23 0.2320 0.2344 0.2344 0.2344 0.2344
R = Tax Revenue R / GDP 0.13 0.1595 0.1560 0.1613 0.1610 0.1611
TR = Tariff Revenue TR / R 0.05 0.0306 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wealth 0.4357 0.4391 0.4420 0.4390 0.4387
Gini Coefficient Income 0.54 0.3931 0.3943 0.3935 0.3939 0.3942
Consumption 0.1827 0.1830 0.1862 0.1833 0.1835
Table 7. Selected Macroeconomic Variables: Subsistenceτ
A = 24.5%, τ
O = 17.1% τ
A = τ
O = 0 τ
κ  = 13.1% τ
n = 14.8% τ
c = 8.6%
K 3.3522 3.2933 3.2933 3.2933 3.2933
L (value) 0.7534 0.5546 0.5546 0.5546 0.5546
B 0.3398 0.3398 0.3398 0.3398 0.3398
 B* 1.3590 1.5648 0.8799 1.5226 1.5710
Total Assets 5.8044 5.7525 5.0676 5.7103 5.7586
τ
A = τ
O = 0 τ
κ  = 13.1% τ
n = 14.8% τ
c = 8.6%
'Zero' wealth 4.796 3.965 3.104 3.440
Low Median wealth 0.205 -1.235 -0.658 -0.698
productivity Mean wealth 0.136 -1.343 -0.712 -0.761
99th Percentile -0.712 -2.937 -1.360 -1.574
'Zero' wealth 2.778 1.880 1.380 1.667
Medium Median wealth 0.212 -1.237 -0.655 -0.688
productivity Mean wealth 0.143 -1.346 -0.707 -0.753
99th Percentile -0.707 -2.943 -1.357 -1.569
'Zero' wealth 1.556 0.477 0.367 0.598
High Median wealth 0.257 -1.300 -0.632 -0.635
productivity Mean wealth 0.185 -1.421 -0.685 -0.704
99th Percentile -0.660 -3.016 -1.326 -1.518
Average gain 0.261 -1.218 -0.610 -0.642
Table 8. Asset Holdings: Subsistence
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Figure 2 